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Abstract
This paper explores the notion that business calls for an adversarial ethic, akin to that of sport. On this view, because of 
their competitive structure, both sport and business call for behaviours that are contrary to ‘ordinary morality’, and yet are 
ultimately justified because of the goods they facilitate. I develop three objections to this analogy. Firstly, there is an impor-
tant qualitative difference between harms risked voluntarily and harms risked involuntarily. Secondly, the goods achieved 
by adversarial relationships in sport go beyond the function of sport, i.e. to entertain audiences. Thirdly, the most plausible 
account of the athlete’s motivational development starts with their love of the sport, which can explain a commitment to the 
sporting ethics in a way that is not paralleled in business. I close by drawing attention to the ways in which an Aristotelian 
conception of business ethics may be able to accommodate these objections.
Keywords Ethics of competition · Market failures approach · Aristotelianism
Introduction
In this paper, I explore the notion that business calls for an 
adversarial ethic akin to that of competitive sport. This con-
ception of business ethics was partly resuscitated by Heath 
(see 2014, p. 6), whose influential Market Failures Approach 
(MFA) to business ethics has been one of the most notable 
developments in the field in recent years, and has gener-
ated much commentary in the business ethics literature (see 
Martin 2013, Jaworski 2014, Néron 2016, Silver 2016, von 
Kriegstein 2016, Hsieh 2017, etc.). It seeks to outline the 
‘implicit morality of the market’ which is to “to generate 
a more efficient allocation of its resources and labor time” 
(Heath 2014, p. 31). This efficiency is taken to be “an irre-
ducibly normative principle” (Heath 2014, p. 10) that, in 
ideal circumstances, would allow market transactions to 
lead to Pareto optimality, i.e. a situation in which no one 
can be made better off without making someone else worse 
off. Where Pareto-inferior outcomes are realised by market 
transactions, this is referred to as ‘market failure’, and the 
MFA aims to provide a moral code that proscribes acting 
in such a way as to promote or exploit such market failures. 
Indeed, according to Heath, “these ‘efficiency imperatives’ 
are pretty much all there is to business ethics, at least with 
respect to market transactions” (2014, p. 174). This effi-
ciency is to be achieved through market competition, hence 
the attempt to draw an analogy with sporting competition.
The analogy between business and sport is supposed to 
suggest that, while adversarial roles do not dissolve morality, 
both domains call for behaviours that are contrary to ‘ordi-
nary morality’ as a result of their adversarial structure, and 
yet this is ultimately justified by the goods they facilitate. 
In both cases, the good facilitated is not the aim of those 
engaged in the activity. Businesses aim at profit, and yet the 
goods of business include the efficient provision of goods 
and services, and a resulting contribution to social pros-
perity. Likewise, athletes and sports teams aim at victory, 
and yet the purpose of sport is to entertain audiences as a 
result of sporting competition, and also, as I go on to suggest 
below, the intrinsic enjoyment of participation and a result-
ing opportunity for moral education. Thus, an analogy with 
sport allows us to better understand the competitive ethics 
appropriate to business. In this paper, I develop three objec-
tions to this analogy with the aim of casting doubt on the 
permissibility of apparently unethical actions in business.
The first of these is the objection from voluntariness. 
The harms that can come our way through the adversarial 
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structure of competitive sport, e.g. a hard tackle in foot-
ball or a left hook in boxing, are justified by the voluntary 
assumption of an adversarial role. However, we can be 
harmed by the adversarial nature of business and the market 
in ways that extend well beyond our voluntary participa-
tion. Even if the value of the market is not contingent on it 
being voluntary, there remains an important qualitative dif-
ference between harms risked voluntarily and harms risked 
involuntarily, a difference that limits the effectiveness of the 
analogy.
The second objection focuses on the goods of sport. The 
goods achieved by adversarial relationships in sport go 
beyond the perceived social function of sport, i.e. to enter-
tain audiences, etc. Sport provides opportunities for the 
achievement of human excellence in a way that is far more 
systematic and integral than is the case in business and the 
market. These goods provide a more compelling rationale 
for our acceptance of apparently unethical behaviour. The 
adversarial nature of sport and therefore the apparently 
unethical actions that it requires are internally related to the 
goods sport achieves, whereas this is not so with business.
Thirdly, the argument from motivation. The most plausi-
ble account of the athlete’s motivational development starts 
with their love of the sport. This is required for the commit-
ment necessary to achieve excellence, and thus is present 
long before competitive success is a feasible aim. It is possi-
ble that success in business is partially born of an enjoyment 
of competitive intensity, and indeed this is likely for the most 
successful business leaders and entrepreneurs, but such a 
commitment is not subordinate to the goods of business (e.g. 
the efficient allocation of goods and services) in the same 
way and to the same extent as is the case in sport. Further-
more, there is a related problem with the motivational force 
of arguments in favour of a competitive ethic in business, 
as it is hard to imagine why someone not committed to the 
precepts of ordinary morality would care about upholding 
the implicit norms of a competitive domain. While the mar-
ket might serve the good of promoting efficiency, businesses 
aim at profit in ways that sometimes exploit market failure, 
and so it is not clear why someone unmotivated by ordinary 
morality would act so as to abide by the implicit norms of 
the market rather than the aims implicit in this particular 
kind of business practice.
While these arguments can stand alone as objections to 
the analogy, they also point us in the direction of a rival, 
Aristotelian, approach to business ethics. In the final sec-
tion, I provide a sketch of an Aristotelian alternative to the 
MFA and conclude that our ordinary conception of ethics is 
already compatible with a strong degree of context depend-
ency. This, I suggest, is more than enough to accommodate 
the apparently unethical actions sometimes required by 
competition, but only when motivation is in good order and 
focused on the goods of the activity in question.
My aim is not to argue that the market is—all things con-
sidered—bad, but rather to challenge a facet of the MFA, 
and secondarily to do so in a way that might make another 
perspective on business ethics, the Aristotelian approach, 
seem more palatable. This latter approach may be less enthu-
siastic about the market than the MFA, but for the most part 
Aristotelian business ethicists are not anti-market overall, 
just wary of its excesses.
The Analogy Between Business and Sport
One way to understand business ethics is as an ethics that 
pertains to a fundamentally competitive domain, as dis-
tinct from our ordinary conception of ethics which priori-
tises cooperation, benevolence, altruism, and so on. This 
view taps into important and widespread intuitions about 
the nature of business as being fundamentally competitive, 
which suggests an analogy between the ethics of business 
and the ethics of other competitive domains, such as sports 
or games. This conception finds a classic statement in Carr’s 
(1968) famous comparison of business to poker. However, 
while some defenders remained (e.g. Allhoff 2003), it had 
largely fallen out of favour (see Koehn 1997), as research 
focusing on normative ethical theories, such as deontology, 
consequentialism, Rawlsian conceptions of justice, and vir-
tue ethics—all of which hold that our ordinary cooperative 
and often altruistic ethical commitments are applicable to 
the domain of business—came to dominate the field of busi-
ness ethics in the 1980s and 1990s.
The MFA is a reaction against a conception of normative 
business ethics that, critics would suggest, consists of draw-
ing up a “wish list of things that we would like corporations 
to do” (Heath 2019, p. 22). This ‘wish list’ approach leads 
to business ethics being seen as insufficient for the hard-
nosed world of business. The MFA instead seeks to explore 
important theoretical and philosophical issues in business 
ethics without falling prey to the alleged shortcomings of 
research guided by the traditional menu of normative theo-
ries. While the MFA is distinct from this traditional menu, 
it has important similarities with McMahon’s work (see 
McMahon 1981, 2013; as well as Moriarty 2020), and some 
affinity with a variety of other ‘business-focused’ or expli-
catory approaches to business ethics (e.g. Sternberg 2000; 
Marcoux 2009).
According to Heath
There is a close analogy… between ‘corporate social 
responsibility’ and the concept of ‘good sportsman-
ship’ in competitive team sports. In the case of sports, 
the goal is clearly to win – but not by any means avail-
able. Every sport has an official set of rules, which 
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constrain the set of admissible strategies. Yet it will 
generally be impossible to exclude strategies that 
respect the letter of the law, while nevertheless vio-
lating its spirit (e.g. taking performance-enhancing 
drugs that have other legitimate uses, and therefore 
have not been banned). ‘Good sportsmanship’ con-
sists in a willingness to refrain from exploiting these 
loopholes, while nevertheless retaining an adversarial 
orientation. In other words, the obligation is to be a 
team player and to compete fairly, but not necessarily 
to let the other side win (2014, p. 91)
This analogy has been drawn on by several other scholars. 
While holding that it is too narrow, Singer (2018) takes the 
MFA as its point of departure and draws on the analogy 
between business and sport. Smith (2019a, 2019b) wants to 
give ethical intent a more central position than Heath, but 
nevertheless embraces the basic tenets of the MFA and casts 
his own position as a “supportive clarification” (Smith 2018, 
p. 604) of Heath’s position, and also draws on the analogy.
On this view, the ethics of business, like the ethics of 
sport, is constrained by a set of domain-specific rules, but is 
nevertheless compatible with actions contrary to ordinary 
morality, and thus divorced from concerns such as coopera-
tion and altruism. In various sporting contexts, we are per-
mitted to perform actions which harm, or have the potential 
to harm, our opponents. Outside of the special context of 
sporting competition, these actions would be unethical, and 
I term these kinds of action ‘apparently unethical behaviour’ 
or ‘apparently unethical actions’. A hard tackle is permis-
sible in football, a left hook is permissible in boxing, but 
both are apparently unethical, in the sense intended, because 
they would both be impermissible in the ordinary run of 
life. Likewise, so the argument goes, in business we may 
attempt to deceive others, e.g. by exaggerating the benefits 
of a product, or harm them in other ways, e.g. by competing 
with sufficient aggression that they may be driven out of 
business. In other circumstances, i.e. in the run of ordinary 
life, we tend to regard deceiving people, or threatening their 
ability to make a living, as being impermissible, but just as 
sporting competition renders tackling and punching permis-
sible, business renders actions which can cause these harms 
permissible.
In both business and sport, the goods served by the activ-
ity justify this special status and render apparently unethical 
actions acceptable. Yet, in both cases, this good is not actu-
ally the aim of those engaged in the activity. Businesses aim 
at profit, and yet the goods of business include the efficient 
provision of goods and services; athletes and sports teams 
aim at victory, and yet the goods of sport include providing 
entertainment, amongst other things.
This analogy does not, however, generate a free pass to 
commit immoral actions: we are ethically required to avoid 
various loopholes and to refrain from violating the spirit of 
the rules. Applbaum (1999) has shown just how difficult it 
is to construct an account of adversarial professional ethics 
that departs from the requirements of ordinary morality. It 
would be wrong to conclude that such professions can “mint 
moral permissions to do what otherwise would be morally 
prohibited” (Applbaum 1999, p. 3). Thus, perhaps the best 
way to capture the point of the analogy is to note that the 
special competitive domains in question give rise to contexts 
in which many straight-forward, decontextualised ethical 
imperatives do not hold. This is a thought with which we 
are more familiar: do not lie, except when an axe murderer 
is looking for your neighbour, great aunt Maude asks if you 
like the jumper she gave you as a gift, or a young child asks 
whether Santa Claus is real. Context is important, and so it 
would be unfair to caricature the position as an attempt to 
defend obviously and flagrantly unethical behaviour. Nev-
ertheless, in what follows, I offer three objections to the 
analogy between business and sport in order to cast doubt 
on the claim that apparently unethical behaviour in busi-
ness has the same status as apparently unethical behaviour 
in sport, focusing on voluntariness, the goods of sport, and 
motivation, in turn.
The Voluntariness Objection
The harms that may come my way as a result of the adversar-
ial structure of sport are justified by my voluntary assump-
tion of an adversarial role. If I step through the ropes of a 
boxing ring, I become fair game in a way that a person walk-
ing along the street is not. By contrast, we can be harmed by 
the adversarial nature of the market in ways that extend well 
beyond our voluntary participation. This is because while 
market transactions themselves are typically consensual, 
having to participate in the broader system is not.
This point brings to mind Hume’s famous rejection of 
social contract theories of political obligation as being akin 
to a suggestion that “a man, by remaining in a vessel, freely 
consents to the dominion of the master; though he was car-
ried on board while asleep, and must leap into the ocean and 
perish, the moment he leaves her” (1994, p. 193). In such 
a position, it is possible to consent to particular contracts, 
but the wider context is a result of unchosen circumstances 
and is potentially or actually harmful in a variety of ways. 
This is no doubt true of any social formation we might be 
born into. However, the basic point stands, as the harms that 
might result from the basic structure of one’s society are 
qualitatively distinct from harms that result from voluntary 
participation in an activity. The person who finds their free 
movement curtailed by being pinned in a wrestling match 
they willingly entered into is in a different position than the 
person who finds their free movement curtailed as a result of 
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being born into an authoritarian society. Indeed, the person 
pinned in a wrestling match they voluntarily entered into 
is in a different situation from someone pinned in a wres-
tling match within the context of a society in which wres-
tling matches are the only way to make a living. Thus, the 
argument I develop in this section depends on the contrast 
between voluntary participation in sport, and the involuntary 
harms that could result from any set of social and economic 
circumstances. However, because the MFA focuses on mar-
ket society, I restrict my discussion to potentially harmful 
aspects of this society, and in particular on its adversarial 
nature.
Heath acknowledges the basic problem of voluntariness 
that I raise here. He says, “sport is both voluntary and unse-
rious, in a way that having to make a living in a capitalist 
economy is not” (2014, p. 9). However, he argues that it 
does not undermine the fact that the analogy illuminates 
the nature of business ethics: “This would be an issue if I 
thought that the voluntariness of transactions was important 
to the normative justification of the market (which I do not)” 
(ibid).
The possibility of being harmed in a way that is not 
implicit in one’s voluntary transactions, i.e. simply by hav-
ing to make one’s way in a society shaped by the adversarial 
nature of the market, may indeed be unfortunate. However, 
according to the view under examination, the benefits of 
the market outweigh it. It would be preferable if the market 
could provide the benefits it does without both particular 
bad features of life under the market, such as people feeling 
compelled to accept low paid, insecure, or demeaning jobs 
out of necessity or fear of greater evils. It would also be 
preferable if one could do without the more general badness 
of the pressure to adopt a competitive and adversarial ethos 
for much of one’s life. The existence of involuntarily risked 
harms is, at the very least, a morally unattractive feature of 
social and economic life, and one that invites us to focus on 
the goods provided by the market.
Both Cohen and Peterson (2019) and Steinberg (2017) 
claim that Heath’s position is fundamentally consequential-
ist in structure. Heath disavows this: his stated aim is to 
provide “a more rigorous articulation of the central princi-
ples that structure the capitalist economy” (2014, p. 91) and 
more generally the MFA aims to ground business respon-
sibilities in the “powerful ethical resources hiding in plain 
sight within the ‘implicit morality of the market’” (Norman 
2014, pp. 27–28), rather than urging corporations to promote 
general welfare, or some other desirable end. This implicit 
morality is taken to be that of Pareto-efficiency, a situation 
in which it is impossible to reallocate resources to make one 
person better off without making someone else worse off.
However, reconstructing norms in the way the MFA 
aims to is only worthwhile if it at least coheres with a 
valuable practice, and thus is capable of being cast in 
the form of a ‘wish list’. A rational reconstruction of the 
norms implicit in an assassin’s practice might be interest-
ing from the perspective of philosophical anthropology, 
but we would want and expect it to be normatively inert. 
Only when an activity has clear connection to the common 
good will be an explicatory approach to the ethics of that 
activity be apt. Explicating the norms of the market may 
require no further rationale for those already committed 
to the market, but Heath clearly intends his account to be 
persuasive to those who are tempted by other theories, or 
at the very least to generate compelling ethical guidance, 
in the form of a variety of principles (see Heath 2014, 
p. 37), to those not already committed to upholding the 
implicit morality of the market.
If this is so, then this feature of the MFA must take a 
consequentialist form. An argument may have consequen-
tialist elements without thereby rendering the whole argu-
ment consequentialist, and without invoking the features 
of consequentialism that make many way of the term. The 
consequentialist element is especially pronounced given 
that efficiency is the implicit morality of the market. While 
Pareto-efficiency is not reducible to utility-maximisation, it 
remains an inherently consequence-focused concept. Indeed, 
Heath speaks of the compensating benefits of the market. He 
claims that the “well-structured, competitive market econ-
omy produces not just utilitarian gains (where some might 
benefit while others lose) but Pareto improvements (where 
everyone benefits)” (2014, p. 197).
The adversarial ethic that the analogy with sport illus-
trates is supposed to be a set of ‘deontic constraints’, albeit 
with “deontic weakening with respect to everyday morality” 
(Heath 2014, p. 9 [emphasis in original]). However, society 
as a whole is not necessarily duty bound to abide by the 
free market, and so when making a case in favour of our 
tolerating a system which requires an awful lot of apparently 
unethical behaviour, part of the rationale for this toleration 
is surely that the benefits of doing so outweigh the costs. 
I see no way of making sense of this that is not broadly 
consequentialist.
The point here is not that the market does not serve any 
good. Nor is it even that the market does not serve a good 
that outweighs the badness of involuntary adversarial rela-
tionships, even if allowing an adversarial institution to so 
fully structure all of our lives seems particularly likely to 
undermine our chances of living well. After all, we spend 
half of our waking lives at work, and a good portion of the 
other half preparing for or recovering from it. Rather, the 
point is that the harm that results from an involuntary adver-
sarial relationship is qualitatively different from the harms 
that arise from voluntary participation in sport, and further 
that this qualitative difference ought to make us less tolerant 
of the involuntary harms that spring from having to make 
our way in capitalist society.
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Imagine a situation in which some small amount of 
enforced, potentially lethal, gladiatorial combat were nec-
essary to achieve some important good, for instance, to 
appease the gods. In such a scenario, many people would 
likely draw the conclusion that the good served, i.e. avoiding 
the wrath of the gods, is so good that it makes it worth tol-
erating this harm. This is a perfectly reasonable position to 
hold. However, we would still regard this situation as being 
quite different from, and far more morally grave than, a situ-
ation in which purely voluntary competition could achieve 
the same good. Under circumstances in which gladiatorial 
combat were necessary for societal prosperity, to use the 
example of the good the MFA attributes to business and the 
market, I suspect we would draw up more stringent ethi-
cal guidelines, for both participants and spectators, than are 
currently in operation for mainstream sports. While it may 
not be possible for participants to engage in such combat 
half-heartedly, and so they could not be expected to compete 
with benevolence and altruism clearly in mind, I suspect we 
would frown on displays of bravado, forbid television cover-
age, and so on. A necessary evil remains an evil.
Consider instead a more realistic analogy. Airport secu-
rity guards are empowered to occasionally use some degree 
of force against those suspected of wrongdoing, even though 
this means that in some tiny number of cases innocent peo-
ple may be tackled to the ground by those security guards. 
We can recognise that this harm is qualitatively different 
from the harm of being tackled to the ground in football or 
rugby, even if we agree that the good achieved by permitting 
security staff to use force is, all things considered, justi-
fied. Indeed, in business, just as with this airport security 
example, we have an all things considered case in favour of 
apparently unethical behaviour, but in sport this is not so: 
the goods of sport are inconceivable without the adversarial 
element, a thought to which I return below. Thus, there is 
an important disanalogy between business and sport. The 
harms that arise through sport are almost always voluntarily 
risked, whereas having to make a living in capitalist society 
exposes us to involuntarily risked harms that result from 
the adversarial structure of the competitive market. More 
broadly, this observation gestures towards the suspicion that 
harms are too wantonly and unevenly distributed under capi-
talism, which is compatible with the Pareto-efficiency the 
MFA claims as capitalism’s central good.
This suspicion underpins a reason for being sceptical 
about the broader, macro-level consequentialist arguments in 
favour of it, or an ethics that draws significantly on functional 
roles within the capitalist system. Likewise, due to voluntary 
assumption of adversarial roles, harms risked in sport are not 
wantonly distributed. In sport there are also mechanisms to 
ensure that they are not too unevenly distributed. There are 
leagues, ranking point systems, matchmakers, etc. who are 
able to ensure some parity of competitiveness, and again, 
voluntariness allows a competitor to back out if the risk of 
harm is too great. If the average person who decided to take 
up boxing were forced to compete against seasoned profes-
sionals from the outset, then the harms they endured as a 
result would have a different ethical flavour to the harms 
faced by boxers who do, in fact, meet in the ring. “All the 
world’s a stage” wrote Shakespeare, but—to turn our anal-
ogy against itself—if all the world were a boxing ring, we 
would expect social life to be unpleasant. Having to protect 
ourselves at all times is quite a burden.
The Goods of Sport
Given that market transactions themselves are typically vol-
untary, and given that any social and economic system we 
find ourselves in necessarily precedes any opportunity we 
could have to consent to it, it may be thought that the issue 
of involuntariness is not especially pressing. Thus, the argu-
ments addressed in this section, from the goods of sport, 
and the following section on motivation may be thought to 
carry more weight. In any case, we should not lose sight 
of the fact that voluntariness is no guarantee of rightness. 
If someone volunteered to be cannibalised, have a healthy 
limb amputated, or even just to be publicly humiliated, we 
may still regard those who assist in the fulfilment of such 
desires—the cannibal, the amputator, and the humiliator—as 
being ethically dubious. The reason for this is that we are 
often interested in the goods served by a particular activ-
ity or action, and an understanding of the goods of various 
sporting competitions reveals another disanalogy between 
sport and business. It also helps to explain why such sporting 
competitions find a wider and more devoted audience than 
do other competitive domains.
According to Heath, it is important to recognise that 
the good of individual competitors diverges from the good 
of the sport, otherwise “there would be no need to test for 
performance enhancing drugs” (2014, p.98). The analogy 
between business and sport thus assumes that the good of 
teams and athletes is victory achieved through competition, 
and the good for spectators is, principally, the entertainment 
provided by the competition. Singer (2018) adds to this the 
socialising and educational role of sport, which is contrasted 
with its competitive nature. What seems to be missing, on 
this formulation, is an appreciation of the distinctive goods 
of sport, and the human excellence achieved by the athletes. 
These goods are what make risking harm worthwhile, espe-
cially when, at the outset of any athlete’s engagement in 
sport, there can be no expectation of significant income as a 
result, a point I return to in the following section.
Thus, Singer’s point about education is quite right, but it 
only begins to adequately capture the goods of sport if we 
have an expansive understanding of the education sport can 
 M. Sinnicks 
1 3
provide. Restricted to a basic developmental contribution to 
educating children, it ignores much of what is valuable about 
sport. Indeed, sport has the capacity to play a continuing role 
in the moral education of us all. Camus once claimed that 
he learned all he knew about morality and obligations from 
football, but even if most of us want to credit other sources 
with some of our moral development, the ethical significance 
of sporting participation remains impressive, and can con-
tribute to our understanding of fellowship and teamwork, 
and to our development of perseverance, patience, courage, 
and much else besides.
There is also an important aesthetic dimension which 
makes sporting competition, in many cases, especially com-
pelling. CLR James likened cricket to an artform (1963), 
and David Foster Wallace (2006) went even further when 
characterising watching Roger Federer play tennis as a kind 
of religious experience. Mumford recommends that we bring 
“the aesthetics of art and sport… closer together” (2012, p. 
7) and notes that it is possible to appreciate sport for intellec-
tual reasons, a preference manifested in the watching habits 
of so-called purists rather than partisans, though it is prob-
ably common to combine both orientations.
Therefore, the central distinction revealed by this discus-
sion is that the market is valuable for its function, whereas 
sport is inherently worthwhile. If there were some way to 
have the central goods of the market without the competitive 
and adversarial domain of business, then we would probably 
be inclined to do so. This is the impulse behind attempts to 
simulate the market (see Cockshott and Cottrell 1993), or to 
devise forms of ‘market socialism’ (see Ollman 1998; Nove 
2003) which might allow us to retain the informational ben-
efits of the price system, that played such a role in the social-
ist calculation debate, while mitigating the broader effects of 
market conditions as they exist under capitalism. For sport, 
the matter is quite different. This is both because the goods 
of sport are not separable from sporting competition, and 
because we regard the goods of sport to be intrinsically, 
rather than instrumentally, valuable. Hence, amateur partici-
pation is widespread, and even sports fans can be morally 
educated as they develop a subtler appreciation of tactics and 
techniques (Sinnicks 2019).
Again, we see a qualitative difference between the harms 
generated by the adversarial structure of sport and the harms 
generated by the adversarial structure of the market. Appar-
ently unethical behaviour in sport, i.e. behaviour acceptable 
within sporting competition which would be unethical if 
carried out in the ordinary run of life, is necessary to the 
achievement of various kinds of excellence, to the aesthetic 
beauty achieved, and to the moral education provided by 
sport. As such, hard challenges, attempts to intimidate oppo-
nents, etc. are inseparable from the goods of sport, and thus 
it is difficult to coherently regret their existence. The harms 
generated by the adversarial relationships required by the 
market, on the other hand, are simply regrettable, even if we 
judge them to be ultimately acceptable because of the goods 
they facilitate. Likewise, if it were shown that prisons were 
necessary for the maintenance of social order—against much 
available evidence, it has to be said (see Mathiesen 2005)—
we might still lament this fact rather than celebrating it, even 
if our commitment to social order were unwavering.
This issue reveals a deeper disagreement about the nature 
of ethics, namely the way in which the MFA emphasises the 
social function of morality over substantive ethical content. 
Heath claims that the purpose of morality is to reduce col-
lective action problems (2014, p. 102), and that capitalism 
is unworkable without business ethics (2014, p. 265). While 
the MFA is perfectly able to acknowledge the benefits of 
cooperation, there is a danger that this conception of eth-
ics will unduly neglect the question of what is good and 
worthwhile. Our reflections on what is good and worthwhile 
may, of course, have the function of reducing collective 
action problems, but presumably such an outcome is desir-
able because the actions aimed at are good and worthwhile. 
Where the goods aimed at are illusory, there may be ‘felt’ 
collective action problems that are better left unresolved. For 
instance, imagine a group of chess enthusiasts who set out 
to eat nothing but junk food in a bid to hold a record as the 
world’s fattest chess club, in order to enjoy the fame, glory, 
or sense of satisfaction that holding such a record might 
provide. However, in this scenario each individual is wary 
of the harms of obesity, and so wants the others to put on 
most of the weight, and as a result maintains a balanced diet 
and solid exercise regimen. Here we have a collective action 
problem, but in this case a resolution is undesirable because 
the goal it frustrates is not worthwhile.
Given that the appeal of the MFA hinges on the value of 
the function of the market, it presupposes a division of moral 
labour, according to which moral goods are pursued by insti-
tutions rather than individuals. This moral division of labour 
seems to be justified because it tends to promote human wel-
fare overall. However, it often requires individual human 
beings to develop interests, desires, and characteristics that 
prevent them from flourishing, e.g. where excessively adver-
sarial and competitive traits are conducive to success. In the 
case of legal institutions, this division of moral labour may 
be a price worth paying, but it is less clear that this is so in 
the case of business organisations. This is in part because 
we imagine that the good of justice requires legal institu-
tions, whereas the relationship between social prosperity and 
the market is more contingent, and it is an open question 
as to whether social prosperity could be achieved without 
the market. Similarly, while we would not trade our current 
situation for one where justice were less available but legal 
institutions were less adversarial, it is possible, likely even, 
that we would be willing to sacrifice some financial prosper-
ity for a world less in thrall to the market.
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It would probably be an exaggeration to claim that the 
flourishing of each is a condition of the flourishing of all: 
those who sacrifice themselves in a glorious revolution do 
not thereby doom the revolution to failure. Nevertheless, 
there is something disquieting about a position which is 
untroubled by the prospect of some people being lumbered 
with a treadmill of a job, morally impoverished because of 
an excessively combative work environment or job role, or 
simply wasting their time and efforts on trivialities, because 
it contributes to an overarching social function. Critiques of 
work in market-based societies usually focus on low paid 
and insecure work, as well they might, but it is also worth 
remembering former Facebook employee Jeff Hammerbach-
er’s comment that the “best minds” of his generation “are 
thinking about how to make people click ads” (Vance 2011). 
This work may contribute to the market overall, and the mar-
ket may contribute to societal prosperity overall, but there is 
something undeniably sad about this deployment of talent.
The Argument from Motivation
Because of the goods of sport, and because making a liv-
ing from sport is an extremely unlikely eventuality even for 
highly talented young athletes, and certainly for the over-
whelming majority of people who participate in sport, it 
is safe to assume that even for elite level professionals, an 
engagement in a particular sport is initially motivated by 
a love of that sport. This is probably not true for business 
and the market. However, it would be a caricature to pre-
sent business and the market as domains in which actors are 
always and only extrinsically motivated. While, as Heath 
notes, “making peace with capitalism essentially involves 
acknowledging the value of the profit motive” (2014, p. 
11), there is clearly scope for an enjoyment of competi-
tive engagement in business life, and indeed it is hard to 
make sense of the extreme levels of commitment and pas-
sion shown by well-known business magnates such as Steve 
Jobs or Jeff Bezos solely in terms of instrumental motiva-
tion. Nevertheless, it seems fair to assume that extrinsic 
motivation is considerably more likely in the domains of 
business and the market. While ordinary workers may be 
partly motivated by a sense of fellowship or friendship in the 
workplace, the tasks carried out in most ordinary jobs do not 
attract many amateur participants. Thus, motivation presents 
a third significant disanalogy between business and sport.
Our expectations about motivation in sport colour our 
judgements as spectators as well as participants. Sports fans 
typically express frustration when they perceive a particular 
athlete as ‘only in it for the money’, just as we would disap-
prove of the airport security guard who tackled people to 
the ground with relish. An athlete insufficiently concerned 
with glory and the achievement of sporting excellence may 
still permissibly engage in apparently unethical behaviour, 
but our general attitude towards such behaviour is shaped 
by our understanding that sport is a domain in which such 
motivations are sometimes, perhaps often, laudable. As 
such, this permissibility is akin to that of using one’s right 
to free speech to spout ignorant and deliberately offensive 
nonsense: permissible in that it cannot be legitimately pro-
scribed, but still something we should take a dim view of. 
Even where an individual’s love of their sport has declined, 
eroded through years of striving for professional success, the 
nature of victory celebrations is often hard to make sense of 
unless some of that love survives. Therefore, the apparently 
unethical actions required for sporting success—competing 
in a way that risks harming, and in some cases seriously 
injuring, the opposition—are, in part at least, motivated by 
a commitment to the goods of sport and the achievement 
of excellence. This motivation by the goods of sport also 
feeds into a broader ethical motivation that allows us to see 
how the apparently unethical behaviour permitted in sport 
is actually compatible with, rather than in contrast to, our 
ordinary ethical concerns.
The ethics of sport may have been degraded by profes-
sionalisation (see Whysall 2014), and it would be wrong to 
paint too rosy a picture. Indeed, this phenomenon of deg-
radation supports my broader argument, as it suggests that 
there was something inherently worthwhile in sporting com-
petition that was liable to degradation. As a result of this, 
there remain a number of ways in which the ethics of sport 
seems to transcend the ethics of adversarial competition. 
For example, players of various sports sometimes ease off 
an outclassed opponent rather than run up the score, cricket-
ers sometimes ‘walk’ (i.e. depart the field of play because 
they know themselves to be out, even when an umpire has 
not given them out), and so on. Such behaviours are super-
erogatory, from the perspective of the basic requirements 
of sportsmanship and the minimal standards required to 
maintain the existence or popularity of the sport. Indeed, 
such behaviours seem to make sense only if competitors 
genuinely care about the sport in question or are guided 
by the precepts of ordinary morality. Intrinsic motivation 
tends to mitigate possible excesses of adversarialism, and it 
is because of their intrinsic motivation that many sporting 
competitors behave as they do.
The analogy between business and sport presupposes that 
in such competitive domains, the requirements of ordinary 
morality, often associated with the ‘golden rule’ of treat-
ing others as we would wish to be treated, are suspended. 
However, this holds more for business than it does for sport, 
revealing another notable disanalogy. Intuitively, it seems 
implausible to think, when playing sport, that we would 
wonder ‘how would I feel if the opposition did this to me?’ 
(Heath 2014, p. 102). However, in an interesting way, we do. 
It is a feature of voluntary participation that we know, and 
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endorse, the fact that our opponents are trying to beat us. If 
a team wins a tournament because their opponent ‘throws’, 
i.e. deliberately loses, the final, they would be disappointed. 
If someone wins a tennis tournament because all of their 
opponents withdraw with injuries just before each match, 
they would be unlikely to celebrate such a triumph with the 
usual vigour. It is hard to imagine Pepsi being similarly sad-
dened if Coke exited the market.
In sport, we want our opponents to compete against us. 
As Nguyen puts it “often, I must try quite hard to beat my 
opponent for them to have a good time” (2017, p. 123). Such 
desires are not universal, and one demonstration of the fact 
that some athletes are not concerned with fair and honest 
competition, and do not wish to be treated as they treat oth-
ers, is the phenomenon of serious and systematic rule break-
ing, a phenomenon also familiar to the world of business.
According to the MFA, competition in business “can pro-
vide at best an excuse for unethical conduct, not a justifica-
tion” (Heath 2018, p. 533). However, “the availability of 
the excuse may be conditional upon the firm having taken 
reasonable measures to bring other firms into compliance” 
(ibid), that is to say, compliance with various regulations, 
and indeed the broader ethical commitments implicit in the 
market that such regulations, when in good order, seek to 
uphold. If everyone is doing it, then the benefits of doing it 
become negated, and the harm that results from not doing it 
becomes hard to ignore. Thus, non-compliance “is like dop-
ing in sport, where the primary effects cancel out” (Heath 
2018, p. 532). While sporting competition necessitates many 
apparently unethical actions, i.e. the hard tackles and left-
hooks which would be unethical outside of sporting con-
texts, use of performance-enhancing drugs (PEDs) remains 
morally censured, though it can be forgiven when athletes 
have the right intentions (when, for instance, there are thera-
peutic use exemptions—see Pike 2018). Again, we see that 
the motivation of athletes, and our expectation that they be 
somewhat intrinsically motivated, colours our ethical judg-
ments of them. This intrinsic motivation itself grounds a 
commitment to the ethics of sport understood in a broad 
sense, and not merely a sense of upholding the implicit 
norms of competition.
What, then, is the status of the claim that use of PEDs 
is unethical? It is hard to imagine someone being totally 
unpersuaded by the ordinary ethical objections to PED 
use, but persuaded by an objection based on the fact that it 
undermines the norms of the practice. The practice is only 
valuable if it is valuable according to some practice-trans-
cendent perspective. As a result, we may wonder why we 
would expect athletes to care about norms that sustain their 
practices, but not norms that sustain social life more gener-
ally. If we can persuade someone to forego cheating, even 
where doing so is likely to help them win, and even where 
they are unlikely to be caught, then it seems they already 
regard the good of victory as being subordinate to some of 
the precepts of ordinary morality. If someone is immune to 
appeals to the latter, then they are likely to be immune to 
appeals to the former too. To care about the implicit norms 
of the practice is already to be open to ethical persuasion. 
Indeed, if sport is able to morally educate us it is because we 
can draw on its lessons in extra-sporting contexts.
Those who participate are motivated by victory, but have 
to respect the rules so that the sport does not lose its appeal 
which results from the fact that it is entertaining to audi-
ences. To undermine this appeal could undermine the weight 
of the aimed at victory, and perhaps even the viability of the 
sport itself if we take the example to extremes. However, 
it would really take an unimaginable, systematic breach of 
the rules or the spirit of the rules, to undermine the popular-
ity of a particular sport, and it would take something truly 
seismic to render unavailable the good of victory. Thus, it 
seems implausible that sustaining the activity by abiding by 
its implicit norms, and thus guarding against the prospect of 
victory becoming unavailable, is what motivates participants 
to refrain from breaching rules when they can do so with-
out consequence, or from competing in an unappealingly 
underhand, though legal, manner. Participants do not want to 
lose their source of income, of course, but they do not seem 
to be consumed by a burning desire to grow the appeal of 
their sports (i.e. in cases where sports have regional rather 
than global appeal, such as cricket and baseball). So again, 
it seems that a desire to uphold implicit norms because they 
are essential to the maintenance or promotion of the activ-
ity seems an insufficient basis for a normative argument. 
The implicit norms themselves must be deemed valuable, a 
notion which applies to both the motivation to compete and 
the motivation to abide by ethical principles.
What is the upshot of this point for the case of business 
and the market? Imagine someone who cares primarily 
about enriching themselves through exploiting market fail-
ure, which is how Heath characterises some leading work 
in strategy (e.g. Porter 2011). There seems to be no rea-
son to think that we can persuade this person to care about 
the implicit norms of the market, but not about basic moral 
principles. After all, both can sometimes undermine com-
petitive success. To persuade them of either would be a 
struggle as they constitute an apparently alien orientation, 
but to aim to persuade them to be motivated by the implicit 
morality of the market but not ordinary morality would be 
to stop at an arbitrary and excessively modest point. Even if 
businesses rely on a well-functioning market, it is not clear 
why, absent some business-transcendent moral concerns, 
they would be motivated to care about upholding Pareto-
efficiency when they can easily get away with not doing so. 
This is true even where it is recognised that it is best for all 
if Pareto-efficiency is held up as an ideal, and even where 
the managers, directors, and employers of the business in 
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question want the market, in general, to be regulated so as 
to promote this end. Indeed, there is an unresolved ques-
tion of why someone engaged in business practice should 
be motivated to uphold the norms implicit in the market, 
rather than the norms implicit in their industry, organisa-
tion, or workplace. If accepting the value of the market is a 
judgement that transcends engagement in market activities, 
then it seems to rely on ordinary morality. However, if we 
need to introduce ordinary morality as a justification at this 
stage, there seems to be no reason it cannot play a continu-
ing role in reflections on ethics and business. Because of this 
problem with ethical motivation, it seems that the MFA is in 
danger of being another practically inert wish list, albeit one 
that settles for some very modest wishes.
Towards an Aristotelian Alternative
To cast doubt on the analogy between business and sport 
would be to deprive the MFA of some of its intuitive appeal. 
The failure of the analogy suggests that even within a para-
digmatically competitive domain, such as sport, where many 
apparently unethical actions are permitted, we are still very 
much guided by extra-competitive ethical principles, i.e. 
principles which derive from ordinary morality. It is only 
in the special cases where harm is voluntarily risked, and 
where some important good is achieved, that apparently 
unethical behaviour is permitted in sport, and even then, 
competitors may be criticised if they are perceived to be 
improperly motivated. The ethics of sport as we understand 
it ultimately transcends, rather than exists as merely implicit 
in, the adversarial and competitive aspect of sport.
Having set out my objections to the analogy between 
business and sport in the previous sections, in this section I 
turn to the question of what sort of account might be able to 
accommodate them. While these objections are intended to 
be able to stand alone as reasons to be suspicious of the role 
the business-sport analogy plays in defences of explicatory 
approaches to business ethics, including the MFA which I 
have focused on in this paper, they also have a distinctly 
Aristotelian tenor. While it is impossible to do justice to the 
complexities of Aristotelian ethics in a single paper, let alone 
a single section, in what follows I attempt to outline how the 
points raised fit within the Aristotelian framework, with the 
aim of encouraging dialogue between adherents of the MFA 
and Aristotelian accounts of business ethics.
Developed most notably in his Nicomachean Ethics (NE) 
and Politics (Pol), Aristotle sets out an account of ethics that 
reserves a foundational place for human flourishing. The 
achievement of the human good is, on this view, the central 
aim of the ethical life. This good cannot be achieved merely 
through following ethical rules (NE 1094b), but requires 
us to develop certain excellences, i.e. virtues, of character. 
After all, no one can tackle life’s challenges without courage 
or kindness, and no life is happy in the absence of friend-
ships, which require honesty, constancy, as well as a vari-
ety of other virtues. These virtues are, according to Aris-
totle, always means between opposing extremes of excess 
and deficiency—courage is the mean between cowardice 
and rashness, generosity is a mean between miserliness 
and extravagance, wittiness is a mean between boorishness 
and buffoonery—and require practical habituation to fully 
develop. Ultimately, human flourishing can only be achieved 
within a political community, a kind of association to which 
we are naturally suited (Pol 1252b). In what follows, I detail 
how the concepts underpinning the objections to the anal-
ogy between business and sport I raised above—from volun-
tariness, goods, and motivation—fit within the Aristotelian 
approach to ethics.
While the voluntariness objection is the most general of 
the arguments I developed above, and it seems likely that 
any normative theory will want to accept an important dis-
tinction between harms risked voluntarily and harms risked 
involuntarily, it nevertheless connects to some Aristote-
lian themes. Aristotelian ethics is typically concerned with 
questions of what virtuous individuals are disposed to do, 
and competing with the possibility of harming voluntary 
opponents seems to be more compatible with individual vir-
tue than does possibly harming those who are not willing 
adversaries. Furthermore, according to Aristotle, we only 
deserve praise or blame for voluntary actions. Actions that 
are forced or a result of ignorance are to be regarded as 
involuntary (NE 1109b). Similarly, while actions performed 
under necessity or because of a fear of greater evils—which 
is how I characterised some of the less desirable elements of 
market society above—are not straightforwardly involuntary, 
Aristotle suggests that they are ‘mixed’ (NE 1110a). This 
point suggests there are grounds for an Aristotelian critique 
of harms, and indeed rewards, that result from involuntary 
participation, and certainly accords with the distinction 
between sport and business drawn in the above discussion.
More broadly, the notion that the political community 
is concerned to promote citizens’ flourishing suggests that 
providing protection against involuntarily risked harms is, 
insofar as it is possible, a worthy goal. Similarly, we might 
reasonably suspect that a system in which people are forced 
into competitive and adversarial relationships is inimical to 
a sense of community, and thus the Aristotelian position is 
well placed to account for why we might take a dim view of 
some of the consequences of the adversarial nature of the 
market system.
The importance of voluntariness is shown by other 
aspects of the ethics of sport too. Sport can allow us to 
develop friendships (see Jones 2001), but for Aristotle 
friendship requires shared commitment to the good, and can 
only be a part of sport as a result of voluntary participation. 
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Likewise, courage can be developed in sport (see Corlett 
1996), but courage implies a willingness to face danger, and 
so again implies voluntariness. In these cases, the nature of 
the various goods pursued is what is most important, and 
so they lead us on to the argument from the goods of sport.
According to Aristotle, “[e]very craft and every method 
of inquiry and likewise every action and deliberate choice 
seems to seek some good” (NE 1094a). Thus, a focus on the 
good and various goods is at the heart of the Aristotelian 
conception of ethics. Aristotle’s own writings on ethics offer 
a systematic examination of the goods of happiness, vir-
tue, pleasure, friendship, etc. Furthermore, the focus on the 
goods of sport fits neatly with Aristotle’s distinction between 
praxis, intrinsically valuable activity, and poiesis, instru-
mentally valuable productive activity. Characteristically and 
for the most part, sport answers to the former description, 
business to the latter.
Sports also fit neatly within MacIntyre’s (2007) Aristo-
telian concept of ‘practices’, in some ways an extension and 
attempted refinement of the concept of praxis, which has 
been highly influential within the business ethics literature 
(see Ferrero and Sison 2014). Practices, in this sense, are 
activities that possess ‘internal goods’, i.e. goods which can-
not be achieved in any way other than engaging in the activ-
ity in question (MacIntyre 2007, p. 187). Such goods stand 
in contrast to external goods, such as money, power, and 
fame, which can be achieved in a variety of ways (MacIntyre 
2007, p. 188), and thus have no special connection to any 
particular activity. These internal goods mean that practices 
are able to be schools of the virtues, and allow sporting prac-
tices to help us to achieve human excellence by developing 
such virtues as perseverance, patience, and courage.
The concept of a practice also provides a powerful 
account of what work could be like at its best. While it is not 
possible to conceive of business itself as a practice (see Bea-
dle 2008), many forms of work available under contempo-
rary capitalism do deserve such a status, and various sports 
are often taken as paradigmatic examples. The concept of a 
practice binds the arguments from goods, the argument from 
motivation, and by extension the argument from voluntari-
ness, together, as it is the goods of an activity that motivate 
us to engage in it, and thus make us voluntary participants. 
As such, it allows us to recognise the coherence of the three 
objections raised in the preceding sections.
The notion that the goodness of an activity is what ought 
to motivate us to engage in it is central to the Aristotelian 
conception of proper activity, and explains why the topic 
of good and meaningful work—work that is not trivial or 
characterised by an excessive combativeness—is central to 
the Aristotelian approach to business ethics (see, for exam-
ple, Beadle and Knight 2012; Sison and Fontrodona 2012). 
By contrast, an agent’s reflections on the worth and mean-
ing of their work is a difficult issue for the MFA as it is not 
clear that an account of ethics so focused on the broader 
function of an activity can account for individual motiva-
tions. This emphasis on proper motivation also allows us 
to clearly understand why an excessive focus on victory or 
prize money is troubling in the context of sport, which, as 
I noted in the discussion of the objection from motivation, 
can be frustrating even to partisan fans.
The emphasis on proper motivation also enables us to see 
how the goods internal to sport can prevent the pursuit of 
money and victory from always becoming overwhelming, 
and it is worth noting that Aristotelian accounts often recom-
mend being wary of an excessive focus on money in business 
too, as noted by Bragues (2006). A similar point could be 
made about a variety of other virtues, perhaps including pru-
dence and magnanimity, which pertain to good judgement 
and appropriate concern with honours, respectively, and 
in a sporting context and depend on agents being properly 
attuned to the relevant goods. Bragues also draws attention 
to the way the virtue of self-restraint is necessary to health 
and fitness (2006, p. 347) and thus is obviously important for 
the achievement of sporting goods. Likewise, the virtue of 
justice plays an important role in sport. According to Aris-
totle’s conception of general, rather than particular, justice, 
the just person aims to contribute to the good of the com-
munity (NE 1129b). As Austin puts it, “This form of justice 
is relevant to sport in many ways. It can be developed as a 
player befriends teammates and seeks their good. It is also 
present when an athlete treats opponents, coaches, officials, 
and fans with respect” (2013, p. 45). Similarly, particular 
justice is central to sport: we want accolades for excellence 
to be distributed to those who deserve them, and rectifica-
tory justice to apply to those who break rules.
So far, my account has focused on individual motivation, 
but given Aristotle’s emphasis on politics as the summa-
tion of ethics (NE 1099b), we should not draw too sharp 
a distinction between individual and wider community. 
The interrelatedness of these levels is central to Aristote-
lian conceptions of ethics, including business ethics, and 
many Aristotelian business ethicists make a concern with 
the organisation central to their work (e.g. Solomon 2004, 
Moore 2017). According to Solomon, “[c]orporations are 
real communities, neither ideal nor idealized, and therefore 
the perfect place to start understanding the nature of the vir-
tues” (Solomon 1992, p. 325). While Solomon’s optimism 
about the availability of community within corporations may 
be unsustainable (Sinnicks 2020), there is an important grain 
of truth here: the sense of fellowship available within the 
workplace is an important part of many people’s motivations 
at work, and thus an important and ethically salient factor 
in the choices they make as part of their professional lives. 
Another Aristotelian business ethicist, Hartman, poses the 
following rhetorical question:
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Do you want to be the sort of person who can enjoy 
only overwhelming financial success? Or the sort 
of person who enjoys a life in which work plays an 
important but not dominant role and in which that 
work offers challenge, variety, growth, association 
with interesting people, and compensation that lets 
you live comfortably? (Hartman 2013, p. 78)
The challenge, variety, growth, and association appealed to 
here are not ethically neutral and are, for the Aristotelian, 
legitimate, indeed unavoidable, considerations for anyone, 
including those in business. This thought connects to the 
broader concerns about moral motivation raised above. The 
Aristotelian approach to business ethics sees our pursuit of 
flourishing, and relatedly of virtue acquisition, as central to 
our motivation in both our personal and professional lives. 
Being a good friend to a co-worker may sometimes be in ten-
sion with discharging one’s work duties and thereby contrib-
uting to the efficiency of the market, and for the Aristotelian 
it is sometimes right to prioritise the former.
Defenders of the MFA might suggest that this Aristotelian 
account is all well and good for the level of the individual 
or of the local community within a particular workplace or 
department—of course individuals themselves will worry 
about the quality of their work, how they can pursue a 
flourishing life, how they can act with integrity in the work-
place, and so on—but the MFA focuses primarily on the 
macro-level of government and regulation. However, there 
is clearly scope for the Aristotelian approach to depart from 
the micro-level of individual agents. Indeed, there have been 
contributions by Aristotelian business ethicists on meso- and 
macro-level topics such as corporate governance (Sison 
2008, Moore 2012), interorganizational networks (Bernac-
chio 2018), stakeholder theory (Wijnberg 2000), corporate 
philanthropy (Nicholson et al. 2020), employee rights (Ber-
nacchio 2020), regulation (Sinnicks 2014), financial reform 
(Nielsen 2010), and organizations and society (Morrell 
2012), amongst others. However, on the Aristotelian view, 
reflections on these topics aim at more than upholding the 
implicit morality of the market, which it regards as exces-
sively thin. They aim to explore, and provide intellectual 
support for, ways in which commercial life can sustain and 
promote various goods beyond those spontaneously gener-
ated by the market. As such, its advocates are unlikely to be 
neutral between the promotion of sporting excellence and 
the promotion of devising ways to make people click on ads, 
to return to an earlier example.
To promote one form of work over another is to depart from 
the judgemental egalitarianism of the market. Many of our 
institutions are shaped by the thought that it is better to want 
some things rather than others, and this already has an impact 
on market behaviour, i.e. on what we buy, the jobs we prefer, 
and so on. Thus, it seems an unwelcome and ad hoc restriction 
to require that discussion of the broad array of topics that falls 
under the heading ‘business ethics’, and legitimate ethical 
guidance to people who engage in business, be subordinated 
to the implicit norms of the market. Indeed, if, as MacIntyre 
claims, avarice is a “highly valued character trait”, even “a 
duty” (2016, p. 127) in contemporary capitalist society, and 
the modern economic order “provides systematic incentives to 
develop a type of character that has a propensity to injustice” 
(1995, p. xiv)—in line with the excessively competitive and 
adversarial ethos noted above, and connected to the Aristote-
lian vice of vanity—then this subordination should be resisted.
A further reason for resisting this subordination is the fact 
that underpinning much of our ordinary understanding of eth-
ics, which the MFA holds is inadequate as a basis for business 
ethics, and our understanding of the ethics of an adversarial 
and competitive domain such as sport, is a conception of 
human flourishing. At first sight it can seem that these operate 
quite differently, with ordinary morality being relatively unme-
diated and competitive ethics being mediated by the require-
ments of adversarial roles. But this distinction depends on an 
excessively narrow interpretation of ordinary morality. Our 
ordinary ethical practice is always strongly mediated by the 
contexts we inhabit and roles we occupy, and thus already 
compatible with uncooperatively withholding goods from 
those who have no legitimate claim to them. Should I help 
someone who asks me for assistance in writing a paper? Yes, if 
that person is a friend and regular collaborator; up to a certain 
point, if that person is my student; no, if that person sends an 
unsolicited email on behalf of a dubious looking publisher. 
This question, and the set of answers I have offered, parallels 
the question of whether I should tackle someone to the ground: 
Yes, if that person is an opponent in a fair and appropriately 
matched game of rugby; maybe, if I am an airport security 
guard and I am beginning to suspect doing so is the only way 
to prevent severe harm to others; no, if that person is a random 
passer-by. The insight of the Aristotelian doctrine of the mean 
is that it encourages us to always consider such practical and 
contextual factors in order to avoid the extremes of excess and 
deficiency, which will at times require acting in accordance 
with the implicit norms of the market and at times to deviate 
from them. Because of its focus on the structure of competi-
tion and business roles that competition generates, rather than 
the human agents who occupy those roles, the MFA instead 
counsels deficiency.
Conclusion
In this paper, I have attempted to cast doubt on the analogy 
between business and sport, and in so doing, to undermine 
an important argumentative resource of the MFA, namely an 
intuitively appealing way of defending apparently unethical 
behaviour within a competitive domain. To do so, I have 
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offered three arguments against the analogy: the argument 
from voluntariness, the argument from the goods of sport, 
and the argument from motivation. I intend these objec-
tions to be capable of standing alone, and thus available 
to those who reject the Aristotelian approach to business 
ethics I favour. Nevertheless, I believe the objections have 
a distinctly Aristotelian flavour: the virtuous person cares 
about whether those they harm have voluntarily consented 
to engage in adversarial competition, the Aristotelian per-
spective is well placed to focus on the distinctive goods of 
an activity, and its emphasis on human flourishing allows the 
Aristotelian perspective to make sense the ways in which we 
might be motivated by those goods as well as by the precepts 
of ordinary morality even within competition.
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